to evolve to a new paradigm of homeland security and homeland defense. DOD appears slow in adapting to the demands of the future environment. It clings to the security challenges and structure it desires unwilling to leave the comfort of what it has done in the past. DOD needs to accept their new role that congress has defined for them. It has relegated Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) to a derivative task of their war time mission which leaves little doubt that it will be unable to respond effectively to a no notice complex catastrophe. DOD needs to adapt its force structure to the realities of a post 9/11 environment and create the required structure to meet the DSCA requirements. As part of a national response to complex catastrophes, DOD should consider what changes to National Guard structure would better enable them to perform this role. DOD needs to provide training and resources to support the DSCA missions.
DOD Support of Civil Authorities During No-Notice Complex Catastrophes
The 21st century is only 12 years old and it is difficult to comprehend the dramatic changes to US security concerns within that small amount of time. It is said that a crisis is too valuable to waste because it is only during these periods of crisis Americans can coalesce from a nation of diverse views into one that is laser focused and speaks with one common voice. 1 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 fall into this category. These attacks made it clear that there are some people in this world who wish to harm us and are willing to sacrifice themselves in the process. All
Americans can recall where they were on Sep 11, 2001 and how their lives changed forever after that date. The American electorate has shown short patience for officials perceived as too slow or unwilling to provide the safety and security that most citizens see as the first duty of a government. These events serve as a fixed point in their lives and mark the first time they ever felt fear in their homes. The nation would begin moving again with a new normal as it adjusted to life with improved security measures.
Safety and security are now inextricably entwined and serve as the yardstick by which the public measures the worth of their government.
Increased expectations on DOD demand a new preparedness. The entire national security process and organization has adapted to the new environment, DOD must respond in kind. The time is now for DOD to adjust to the new security demands of supporting catastrophic events in the homeland. Terrorists' attacks of 9/11 and the devastation of Hurricane Katrina generated many studies, commissions, and recommendations. 2 These improbable BLACK SWAN events are rare but have a high impact on behavior. They demonstrate how the improbable can become possible and force us to reconsider where we may have blind spots in our planning. 3 Almost every 2 change to our domestic security legislation-each reorganization, policy decision, or funding decision dealing with national preparedness-over the last decade is evaluated on how it would improve our ability to prevent or mitigate the effects of one or both of these events. The creation of a cabinet level post, Homeland Security Secretary, oversees a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with 24 agencies for synchronizing the security of the US homeland. 4 The Unified Command Plan (UCP) of 2002 was modified by the President to create a geographical combatant commander for North America (US NORTHCOM) responsible for synchronizing US homeland defense. In an era of declining resources, mounting federal debt, and a rebalancing US security policy, there is mounting pressure to ensure that we create the correct correlation of policies and resources to manage risk in the homeland and not lurch from one event to another.
There is a growing suite of missions requiring DOD response and preparedness.
All incidents are local but, no-notice complex catastrophes are must plan for events by DOD. The Department of Defense has not yet fully defined and categorized these unexpected catastrophic events or its approach to dealing with them. DOD is currently using 'catastrophic events' as an interim definition. 5 The Joint Publication defines this as "any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, national morale, and/or government functions". The Government Accounting Office (GAO) used the term "catastrophic natural disaster" to describe Hurricane Katrina. 6 Congress has used similar terms in guiding much of the reshaping of the National Security structure to counter threats to security and the defense of the US homeland. DOD has been focused in fighting the Global War on
Terror. Now, as the second war in the past decade winds down in Afghanistan, DOD should be looking at the security environment and crafting its future force. Earthquakes that impact a population of 10 million people or the detonation of a 10 kiloton nuclear device would clearly require a DOD response based on the amount support required.
The civilian guidance for Hurricane SANDY is a clear insight into future complex catastrophes in that DOD is expected to "Go Big, Go Fast, and Go Smart" in supporting civilian authorities. In order to respond to increased expectations and a growing suite of missions for the US military, DOD must chart a way forward to insure success. This paper focuses on ways DOD can prepare to respond to no notice complex catastrophes. It excludes portions that would be worthy of papers themselves such as Cyber events, support provided under title 31 USC (Economy Act), and infrastructure resilience. In reviewing the required capabilities for support of civil authorities, it is clear the majority of the assets are located in the Army. They are geographically and organizationally dispersed through the Active Army, National Guard, and the Army Reserve. Events requiring defense support to civilian authorities are politically charged rescue operations that require speed, mountains of logistics, and communications delivered in a coordinated manner. We can do this by establishing the correct organization, force structure, and training programs to prepare for these new no-fail missions.
DSCA Strategic Environment
The The Stafford Act of 1974 defines the conditions and the process by which the president may render federal assistance. There are three categories of assistance, fire management assistance, emergency declarations, and major disaster declarations. Fire assistance is normally approved by the regional FEMA administrator. Emergency and major disaster declarations require the President's approval. All require a formal request for assistance from the governor before any assistance can be approved. The exception to this rule is for cases where the President "determines that an emergency exists for which the primary responsibility for response rests with the United States because the emergency involves a subject area for which the constitution or laws of the United States exercise exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority". continues to interpret the act in the most severe way, even directing that it applies to the Navy and Marines despite the fact it was never intended to be used to limit their abilities to support law enforcement. DOD policy for the Navy and Marines to adhere to the Posse Comitatus Act is consistent with their desire not to change. broad range of activities before and after disasters occur. 14 Congress has been quite clear in the changes legislated in our national security structure that the federal government will never again be caught unprepared to respond to a catastrophe. There is a clear expectation that DOD will be prepared and ready to support states before they are overwhelmed.
Evolutions in Policy
The Executive Branch and federal agencies quickly developed new policy to implement the reforms directed by Congress. Many of the sweeping changes were issued in Homeland Security Policy Directive -5 (HSPD-5). Using the congressional desire for a national approach to homeland security, DHS defined its over-arching policy for emergency response to incidents and its national preparedness goals. DHS used the integration of federal with state and local emergency managers to create a seamless national response program for security and disaster response. 15 This coordinated National Response Framework (NRF) defines roles and responsibilities as well as the common language of emergency management for a national response program. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) allows a national approach using the collective resources available at all levels. following the glowing success of the Federal response to Hurricane Sandy, many of DOD's implied tasks are now specified and we will likely "Go Big, Go Early, and Go Smart" when disaster threatens our citizens. and 54 National Guard) for purely ceremonial purposes. 24 The USCG has adapted its entire organization to work within the umbrella of security related agencies in DHS in a seamless manner. US NORTHCOM has shaped its structure and training, and enables much of the regional planning for the emergency management operations coordinated by FEMA. Other portions of DOD need to accept the DSCA mission and adapt their organizations to the higher expectations that accompany this new mission.
Perhaps we need to consider new roles for the National Guard and Army
Reserve to meet the DODs mission of responding to catastrophes. These units are located throughout the homeland, and possess the assets or have agreements with other states to generate the support required for a state emergency. They will in all cases be the first responders who arrive to support the initial local fire and police personnel. In a no-notice complex catastrophe, the entire nation must be ready for these events. A well known fact in emergency management circles is that most lives are saved in the first 72 hours of the disaster. Since many of the DSCA implied missions for DOD are rapidly evolving into specified tasks, a top priority should be to review capabilities by location. In evaluating the security requirements of a post 9/11 environment, DOD can better describe the role of the Active duty, National Guard, and
Reserve forces to better align structure and missions to mitigate risk in the homeland. Big, Go Fast, and Go Smart" 27 works for a predictable catastrophes such as hurricanes.
It is useless for no-notice events unless you have developed the plans, built flexible structure, and trained as part of the national response.
DOD Needs to Restructure its Forces
The Army needs to evaluate its current structure based on future environments
and not its comfort zone. DOD, and the Army in particular, are ill structured to execute all of its assigned post OIF/OEF tasks. Poor decisions in a period of declining resources will further degrade their ability to accomplish DSCA missions. This evaluation will be in concert with Congress since the Army, the National Guard, and the US Army Reserve structure changes are a political decision. Congress will ultimately decide on how much risk is acceptable and how much change the nation can afford.
Design the National Guard and Army Reserve structure as the lead for DOD in a national response to complex catastrophes. Every incident is local until it requires additional support. The National Guard response will shape the regional support plan before Title 10 forces arrive as part of a national response to a no-notice complex catastrophe. The Army National Guard has some 360,000 members spread out through 50 states, and 3 territories. The only purpose-built units for DSCA are in the National Guard. Since the National Guard has 8 Infantry divisions with only 1 National Guard division headquarters deploying over the last decade, it is more efficient to reallocate this structure to support capabilities that are required by the regional planning national planning scenarios describe the broad range of incidents. DOD's focus should be on providing trained and ready forces to respond to these incidents. All but two of the scenarios could be met with DODs current array of units. The two no-notice complex catastrophes of a 10 Kiloton nuclear detonation and devastating earthquake are the two black swan events that will overwhelm a regional response. Since
Congress is determined never to be surprised again in the homeland, DOD needs to man, equip, and train forces for these two urgent no-notice catastrophes. Because expectations are elevated and many missions are moving from implied tasks to specified roles, if DOD does not embrace their new role, there will be tension.
US NORTHCOM has a significant training challenge in order to be able to integrate untrained DOD elements into DSCA operations. CDR US NORTHCOM is charged with responsibility for three specific tasks. There is a direct correlation between these specific responsibilities and the requirement to support the 15 base planning scenarios developed with DHS. Casualties for this event are estimated at 86,000 killed and injured, 7.5 Million people displaced and another 2 million households seeking temporary shelter. It is estimated that it will require 42,000 personnel to conduct search and rescue at 1500 locations.
Demands for emergency services, power, natural gas, and shelter will be critical and interruptions into a national economic distribution system will quickly surface. DOD will need to respond rapidly and start generating critical capabilities desired by civil authorities within hours. DOD will be challenged to identify the capabilities, alert, and move them to the area. 31 Sustainment of the population and the responding DOD forces in the affected area will be a critical task. 32 Synchronizing actions with local, state and federal partners will be a key to insure effective use of critical resources.
Portions of the local, state and federal capabilities will be victims of the earthquake and not be able to respond as effectively as planned. All of these events are not normal tasks for DOD. Leaders, staffs organizations need to be trained in how to support civil authorities. DOD capabilities require the equipment and trained personnel to operate them be formed as units in the response. A catastrophe like this will be of strategic national consequence that will eclipse KATRINA and the expectation and tasks to DOD to generate a manned, equipped, and trained force of specialists to cope with CBRN events; it has failed to generate the greater relief operations capability that is required for the area outside of the immediate effects of the 10 KT. Downwind hazards, casualties, and displaced persons generated by this event will quickly dwarf the capabilities of surrounding cities and states because of the amount of population affected. Key infrastructure and personnel will become contaminated by an inability to screen casualties. This will be an event of national strategic consequence that is compounded by the fact it was an attack A 10 kiloton nuclear device in a populated city is the worst case scenario from the 15 national planning scenarios. The effects of this event in a populated region will cause large numbers of dead and wounded. Search and Rescue teams, decontamination teams, and communications suites will be first priorities on any response. DOD will be challenged to identify the capabilities, alert, and move them to the area on such a no notice event without prior training of these units. Sustainment of the population and DOD forces in the affected area will be a critical task. Portions of the local, state, and federal capabilities will be victims of the attack and not be able to respond effectively. Regional forces will respond but will quickly exhaust their resources because in these events almost every form of infrastructure is inoperable or has collapsed under the surge in requirements. Availability of food, water, medical supplies, fuel, and protective gear will be the limiting factors in the success of the response.
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Conclusion
Congress and the civilian leadership have moved a remarkable distance in a short time to evolve to a new paradigm of homeland security and homeland defense.
DOD appears slow in adapting to the demands of the future environment. It clings to the security challenges and structure it desires, unwilling to leave the comfort of what it has done in the past. Consensus for changes to DOD structure is apparent and there is a narrow window of opportunity to outline the requirements of the force for the future environment. The 2014 QDR is an ideal opportunity to address each mission given to
DOD and reevaluate what is actually required to execute.
DOD needs to accept the new role that congress has defined for them. It has relegated DSCA to a derivative task of their war time mission which leaves little doubt that it will be unable to respond effectively to a no-notice complex catastrophe. DOD needs to adapt its force structure to the realities of a post 9/11 environment and create the needed structure to meet the DSCA requirements. As part of a national response to complex catastrophes, DOD should consider what changes to National Guard structure would better enable them to perform this role. DOD also needs to provide training and resources to support the DSCA missions.
Endnotes
